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1 The Web as a sociotechnological system
The sociotechnological system is a system constituted of human individuals and their
artifacts: technological artifacts, institutions, conceptual and representational systems,
worldviews, knowledge systems, culture and the whole biosphere as an evolutionary
niche. In our view the sociotechnological system as a super-organism is shaped and
determined both by the characteristics of the agents involved and the characteristics
emergent in their interactions at multiple scales. Our approach to sociotechnological
dynamics will maintain a balance between perspectives: the individual and the collective.
Accordingly, we analyze dynamics of the Web as a sociotechnological system made of
people, computers and digital artifacts (Web pages, databases, search engines, etc.).
Making sense of the sociotechnological system while being part of it, is also a constant
interplay between pragmatic and value based approaches. The first is focusing on the
actualities of the system while the second highlights the observer’s projections. In our
attempt to model sociotechnological dynamics and envision its future, we take special
care to make explicit our values as part of the analysis. In sociotechnological systems
with a high degree of reflexivity (coupling between the perception of the system and the
system’s behavior), highlighting values is of critical importance1.
In this essay, we choose to see the future evolution of the web as facilitating a basic
value, that is, continuous open-ended intelligence expansion. By that we mean that we
see intelligence expansion as the determinant of the ’greater good’ and ’well being’ of
both of individuals and collectives at all scales. Our working definition of intelligence
here is the progressive process of sense-making of self, other, environment and universe.
Intelligence expansion, therefore, means an increasing ability of sense-making.
The two most significant factors in the dynamics of the sociotechnological system
is increasing complexity and accelerating change (see [Helbing, 2013, Systems, 2013]
1A quite radical approach is that the world is entirely constructed from specific discourses between
people[Willke, 2007, p. 28][Heyes and Hull, 2001, p. 77]
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and 2). These are both consequences of technological progress. Moreover, intelligence
expansion seems to lag behind changes humans introduce into the environment hence
there is lack of foresight and difficulty to envision a sustainable future. As a result
the overall system becomes more fragile. Pragmatically, we think that the challenge of
increasing complexity can be met by intelligence expansion.
2 Intelligence and intelligence expansion
2.1 Sense-making
The concept of sense-making denotes a rich research field active since around 1970s
where insights from philosophy, sociology, cognitive, information and computer science,
organizational studies and more are brought together. A psychologically oriented defi-
nition of sense-making is: sensemaking is a motivated, continuous effort to understand
connections (which can be among people, places, and events) in order to anticipate their
trajectories and act effectively in relation to them [Klein et al., 2006a, p. 3]. Beside
human sciences, the theory of sense-making is also used in researching human-computer
interaction, decision support systems and artificial intelligence [Klein et al., 2006b, p.
5].
Various authors list different aspects of sense-making. It is not our goal to provide
a comprehensive list here. The most important aspects in our context are listed below
and are loosely based on [Wikipedia, 2014]:
• Identity and identification. A prior notion of an entity ’which is making sense’
seems to be needed, but in our framework it is not the case: the identity of cognitive
agents is created during the process. This extension informed by Simondon’s theory
of individuation[Simondon, 1992] is central in our thesis that merges the process
of emergence of boundaries that co-define individuals and their environment and
the sense-making process by these formed individuals into a single process. In
this essay we have chosen to define cognitive agents before sense-making only for
didactic reasons.
• Retrospection. For effective sense-making, both spacial and temporal patterns
(also called ’structure’) should be found in the sensory data (see subsection 3.1).
We use the terms the environment, milieu (environment with history/memory)
and encompassing culture interchangeably in different contexts, but they denote
the same general concept of the structured ’external reality’ of an agent.
• Enaction. The primary component of sense-making is action: an agent acts upon
the environment, catches the ’reflection’ or response of environment and updates
a representation of it (not unlike a sonar). According to [Clark, 2012] perception
is an action where the agent produces a stream of expectations and only corrects
its own model according to incoming information.
2C. Thoeret’s talk at summer school of Web Science and the Mind, Universit du Qubec Montral, July
17, 2014
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• Ongoing. Sense-making is an iterative process of modeling in terms of informa-
tion compression when individuals shape and react to the environments they face
[Wikipedia, 2014];
• Reflexive. Sense-making is a two-ways interaction between the individual and
its environment across the boundary being created during the same process: any
examination, modeling and action of agents ’bends’ the environment and affects
the perception and further decisions by those same agents. Furthermore, in the
context of a sociotechnological system, the environment of an agent are other cog-
nitive agents, therefore sense-making activity is always participatory: intelligence
is always a product of both ’individual’ and ’collective’ (for the related discussion
about collective individuation in social networks, see [Yuk Hui and Harry Halpin,
2013]).
2.2 Individual-environment milieu
We maintain that the most important factor enabling to understand a sociotechnolog-
ical system are interactions among intelligent agents (see section 3.2). Yet, it follows
straightforwardly from our definition of intelligence as sense-making, that agents get
individuated while interacting. Therefore it is important to describe how we treat a
cognitive agent (see subsection 3.1).
In our framework an individuated agent is a kind of sensory machine which makes
sense of whatever sensory information comes through its sensors. Structuring the envi-
ronment in its classical understanding (i.e. taking all the data available and building an
approximate model out of it) is just one option. Other options for making sense of the
environment can be:
• Filtering information as complete information may be less structured than part of
it;
• Forgetting in case of mining for temporal patterns;
• Movement in the environment, therefore changing the immediate surrounding cul-
ture;
• Changing the environment itself.
While we talk separately about the individual and its environment (milieu), ”no in-
dividual would be able to exist without a milieu, that is its complement, arising simul-
taneously from the operation of individuation: for this reason the individual should be
seen as but a partial result of the operation bringing it forth”[Combes, 2013, p. 27]. It
is of fundamental importance to the framework of individuation that the formation of
boundary between individual and milieu is something that is formed during the process
of individuation. The implication of this principle is that the unit of analysis is neither
the individual nor the environment, but the individual-milieu dyad [Simondon, 1992, p.
3].
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A useful framework which helps to understand the formation of individual-milieu
dyad is John Holland’s signal/boundary model[Holland, 2012]. Holland maintains that
”Ecosystems, governments, biological cells, markets, and complex adaptive systems in
general are characterized by intricate hierarchical arrangements of boundaries and sig-
nals” and that these systems can be understood only by studying the origin and co-
evolution of signal / boundary hierarchies[Holland, 2012, p. 12]. In the context of
ecosystems, each new species or adaptation offers new possibilities of interaction (sig-
nals) among species (boundaries) in the ecosystem. An example of the result of such
co-evolution is the fine-tuned Madagascar orchid / sphinx moth dyad [Holland, 2012, p.
29] or ”relationship of propagation between certain flowers and honeybees”[Yuk Hui and
Harry Halpin, 2013, p. 8].
We argue that the emphasis on sense-making as an individuation process that brings
forth cognitive agents in contrast to analyzing static properties of already individuated
cognitive agents is more informative about the nature and prospects of intelligence ex-
pansion on the scales of human individuals, social systems, artificial intelligences, the
internet and the future Web.
2.3 Worldviews
A worldview in the context of sense-making is a gestalt perception, both individual and
collective, in relation to self,others, society and the cosmos at large. Every worldview
is essentially subjective (in the sense that one cannot know what it is like to have a
particular worldview without actually embracing it), or intersubjective, depending on
the choices of the agents and communities sharing them. When applying the concept
to the sociotechnological system, a worldview is a more or less integrated system of
cognitive and behavioral patterns governing the interactions of the agent. In other words,
a worldview is an integral system of sense-making characterizing an intelligent agent.
In our discussion of future scenarios for the sociotechnological system, the intelligence
expansion of an agent at any level is synonymous with the evolution of the worldview
characterizing that agent. Hui and Halpin in their article ”Collective Individuation: The
Future of the Social Web” refer to the concept of a worldview by using German word
Weldbild [Yuk Hui and Harry Halpin, 2013].
In the following section we develop in more detail our scalable framework of individ-
uating cognitive agents.
3 A framework for scalable cognition
3.1 The generic cognitive agent
A cognitive agent is an agent characterized by displaying cognitive activity. Cognitive
activity in the broadest sense may be defined as a non-trivial derivation of actions in
response to events in the agents environment [Franklin, 2008, Franklin et al., 1998].
Non-trivial here means that the derivation of actions is influenced by the environment,
by the situation of the agent and follows a goal or a fitness criteria. Cognitive activity
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also includes adaptation/learning in regard to future derivations of actions based on the
success or failure of previous actions. For example: given a predefined goal or a set of
fitness criteria, if the current action was a successful response of the agent to the current
event, the association between the event and the selected action is reinforced, otherwise
the association is weakened.
Generally, an event is any difference in the environment that affects the situation of
at least one agent. An action is any effect an agent may produce in its environment.
Actions therefore produce events in the environment. An agent is identified by the events
that affect it, by the events it is capable to produce and by the manner the latter are
associated with the first. Of course the manner of association encodes an implicit (and
sometimes explicit) semantic structure; though it may include random or probabilistic
elements, it is never entirely random. In other words, an agent must have a structure.
Similarly, the environment of the agent must have a structure, otherwise there can
be no meaningful way for the agent to associate its actions to events since an environ-
ment without structure will necessarily respond randomly to the agents actions. The
realization of cognitive activity must therefore assume a structural coupling [Maturana,
1975] between the agent and the environment: differences in the environment induce dif-
ferences in the agent and vice-versa. Cognitive activity can be understood therefore as
the manner by which an agent is affecting and being affected by the environment. Such
activity has consequences on the dynamic structures of both agent and environment.
From the standpoint of an agent, the environment is the medium of events (i.e. dif-
ferences) that affect it and are produced by it. When we think about a population of
interacting agents, the actions of agents produce events that affect other agents and
induce them to produce further actions. Agents share an environment to the extent
that they interact through events, i.e. differences they exert on each other, but for each
agent, all other agents are basically just environment3.
Agents, in general, are not necessarily cognitive. A cognitive agent is distinguished in
that it derives actions in response to events in a non-trivial manner. Clearly, some kind
of information processing must be involved for any activity to be considered as cognitive.
But information processing is not sufficient. If an agents response to events involves no
selection and no dependence on a state (i.e. no memory) than it can be considered trivial.
Cognitive activity therefore necessarily involves, in addition to information processing,
an encoding of a situation or a state unique to the agent at a given moment and some
selection mechanism that depends also on this unique state. In other words, if all the
information determining an agents immediate action can be solely derived from the
immediate event it is affected by, than, no cognitive activity is involved on the side of
the agent. This conclusion is consistent with the understanding of structural coupling
because it means that the structure of the agent carries no relevant information affecting
its response to events, i.e. it is unchanging. If the structure of the agent is constant,
it is neither affected nor affecting the structure of the environment, i.e. no structural
3In contrast to this general view, when relating to the formation of coalitions of agents, as we will see
in the following, it is the specific interactions among specific agents that are instrumental to their
organization into coalitions.
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coupling. For cognitive agents, in contrast, there is extra information which is necessary
such as the agents state, goals, knowledge, tendencies, etc.
Following this rationale, the humble thermostat that features in so many examples in
the cybernetic literature is indeed a rudimentary cognitive agent because the knowledge
of its current state is necessary to correctly predict its response to an incoming event
(change in temperature). A simple electronic calculator which is much more complex
than the thermostat in term of information processing is not a cognitive agent because its
input sequence alone (buttons pushed) determines its actions (displaying alpha numeric
characters on its display).
The question remains however whether the presence of information processing, a
unique inner state and structural coupling are sufficient conditions to designate cogni-
tion. On this question there is no clear consensus. In [Adams, 2010] additional conditions
are suggested having to do with the production of semantic content unique to the agent.
Of a particular interest here is the following condition: a cognitive process must involve
semantic content that arise in the cognitive process and is meaningful for the agent. As
well see in the following, selection for relevance and the formation of challenges for the
agent thereof can be considered to produce such semantic content.
A simple yet a very general working definition of cognition can be given now: cognition
is the iterative coordinated processes of:
1. Selecting from the incoming stream of events which events are relevant and which
are not. Relevance need not necessarily be a binary value. Events can be prioritized
with varying levels of relevance according to the selection mechanism involved. The
mechanism responsible for selection for relevance will referred from here on as the
attention mechanism. Attention as an elementary cognitive function is exactly the
singling out of relevance.
2. Given the current (most) relevant event, selecting from the available options of
response what is the most appropriate action to execute next. An action may
produce an event, change the agents state or do nothing. The mechanism respon-
sible for selection for effective action will be referred from here on as the intention
mechanism. Intention as an elementary cognitive function is exactly the singling
out of action.
According to this working definition cognition is basically a selective process. Impor-
tantly, cognition as selection is not necessarily deterministic as the current selection may
involve probabilistic elements in the selective processes, or, dependency on a (possibly
indefinite) number of previous events not all of which can be known (i.e. the current
selection depends on events older than the beginning of observation). Any one of the
selective elementary processes mentioned here can be redundant, but not both of them.
If selection for relevance is redundant (i.e. no selection), either every event is relevant so
the agent is maximally sensitive, or, no event is relevant so the agent is indifferent. For
example: an electron in an electromagnetic field is maximally sensitive, every difference
in the field is relevant to its behavior. It does not select to which differences in the
electric field to respond. If selection for action is redundant (no selection), either the
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relevant event solely determines the action so the agent is maximally instinctive, or, no
action is selected so the agent is inactive. In the example of the electron, the event of
difference in the electric field already determines the electrons response. When an agent
is both maximally sensitive and maximally instinctive, like the electron in the electric
field, it is not a cognitive agent anymore.
Implicit in this definition is that selection is made according to some set of criteria
and possibly according to an internal state that may encode, goals, drives, accumulated
experience of past interactions, predictive models and theories about the environment
and more. These implicit elements constitute together what may be called the context of
the cognitive process. The information content of events is raised to a status of semantic
content as it is related (by selection) to the agents context. For example: an agent sharing
information with her peers on a social network is not merely copying information from
one location to another (information processing). The activity of sharing is related to
context sensitive values such as gaining prestige and trust, inviting exchange, asking for
advice etc. The so called ”automatic” operation of sharing involves selection of what to
share and with whom. These selections indeed give rise to semantic content that mark
the activity as cognitive. In the absence of context there is no cognition. Relevance,
the mark of the agents intelligent interaction with its environment is context sensitive.
It is the agents dynamic situation which guides its cognitive activity. Consequently the
agents actions affect its situation by closing a cybernetic loop through the environment.
An important aspect of our working definition of cognition is that in information
theoretic terms a selection is an operation that reduces the information contained in the
agents state. In other words, it is an irreversible operation. Once part of the information
(the information content of irrelevant events for example) is lost, it is impossible to
reconstruct the agents state prior to selection using only the information present after
the selection. More in specific, the selections the agent makes in response to events are
constraining the variety [Ashby, 1958] of the effects of these events on certain parameters
of its state (say its distance from a goal state).
Reducing information (variety) is how different agents gain different perspectives in
relation to the same events. Each agent reduces the incoming information in a manner
that is unique to its state and goals while selecting. Selection for relevance and selection
for action, therefore, render cognition an irreversible informational process. Context de-
pendent selections clearly seem to be the mechanism by which unique semantic content
arises for the agent. The criterion of structural coupling ensures that the context itself
changes in response to such selection this is how a cognitive agent learns from experience.
Clearly, this poses a criterion that differentiates cognitive agents from general agents:
cognitive activity is characterized by reduction of information and the development of
context sensitive perspectives (semantic content). Following Ashbys discussion of requi-
site variety, a population of cognitive agents with diverse perspectives may achieve with
coordinated activity higher fitness than is achievable by any single agent because they
can together reduce more variety from the effects of the environment4.
4This is a good starting point to establish why coalitions of diverse cognitive agents can achieve more
than any of the participating agents. It also alludes on how the measure the advantage of coalitions.
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From yet another perspective, cognition and most clearly the selection for relevance
are symmetry breaking operations: prior to selection an input set of events may seem
equivalent but post selection events can be regrouped according to relevance into smaller
equivalence sets. The initial symmetry is broken [Heylighen, 1999]. This notion of
symmetry breaking is important in order to understand how the selections of the agent
impart structure on the environment (see next section).
3.2 Scalable cognition
The working definition of cognition suggested in section above is inspired by Bernard
Baars global workspace theory of consciousness [Baars, 1993, Baars, 2005] and Stan
Franklins application of the theory in his work on the ontology of cognition [Franklin,
2006, Franklin, 2008] and artificial minds [Franklin, 1995]. Yet, our definition aims to
highlight different aspects of the cognitive process in order to prepare the ground for a
scalable framework for cognition. In this, it also draws from the concept of adaptive agent
and cognition as an adaptive activity [Holland, 1996]. In essence, the most important
point of similarity to Baars theory is that incoming information is scanned for relevant
items and those relevant items gain for a while the global resources of the cognitive
system in order to produce the appropriate response.
The global workspace theory is a theory that aims to explain functional consciousness
(in distinction from phenomenal consciousness). It starts from a more or less given cog-
nitive system which presents certain complex behaviors and tries to explain how these
behaviors are realized. Very briefly, the Global workspace model of consciousness oper-
ates as follows: many highly specialist and relatively simple cognitive functional modules
are working in parallel, processing incoming information and competing on grabbing the
central stage of the agents cognitive process. Once an item of information wins the
competition it is globally broadcast to all modules, recruiting a great portion of compu-
tational resources of the agent to further attend to the relevant piece of information while
other items are being suppressed. This grabbing of the central stage means the item was
”brought to consciousness”. But the glory of each such item is fleeting as importance
decays in time and soon the whole sequence of competition, and global broadcast repeats
itself.
Our starting point is fundamentally different. First, it is synthetic and not analytic
i.e. it does not aim to explain an existing system (i.e. human cognition) but to construct
a framework for an artificial cognitive process. There is no a-priori given shape to the
system. In fact we aim for open ended emergence of complex cognitive functions. Second,
as we aim to describe a scalable cognitive process, we need to address structures which
are self similar at various scales. This is not a requirement of the global workspace
model. Third, our framework aims to describe cognition as distributed within a diverse
population of agents, while the original global workspace model, though utilizing massive
parallelism at early stages, basically converges to a single stream of processing the stream
of functional consciousness. Fourth, a framework for an artificial cognitive development
without positing a-priori shape of the system and its parts requires defining a process of
boundary formation among different localities across scales.
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We adapt from the global workspace model the basic idea as described above: in
cognition, the selection for relevance (product of the attention mechanism) is the key
for accessing the agents resources. Attention here is somewhat similar to functional
consciousness in Baars and Franklins models in the sense that it indeed recruits the
agents resources but it differs from it in some important points. The difference lies in
the constitution of the selection mechanisms. The mechanisms we need for our framework
must allow for a distributed operation across scales.
3.3 Coalitions
The simple competition and global broadcast model in Baars model is replaced by a
more general concept of ad-hoc workspaces called coalitions. Coalitions are groups of
interacting agents. A coalition implies the sharing and coordination of both information
and semantic content among its participants that facilitates a collective cognitive func-
tion i.e. specialized selection for relevance (attention) and selection for action (intention)
preformed collectively. Coalitions are consolidated by means of spreading activation and
are constituted from the resources and know-how of the participating agents. Already
Franklin [Franklin, 2006, pp. 14-15] mentions the forming of coalitions between com-
peting modules in order to gain access to the global workspace. In our framework the
idea of coalitions occupies a central role and is taken a few steps further: 1. In contrast
to global attention in Baars theory, in our framework attention is distributed among
many coalitions where each coalition is an ad hoc workspace with specific capabilities.
These ad-hoc workspaces are a product of self-organization within populations of inter-
acting agents and are themselves components of higher level coalitions. 2. Interactions
within coalitions involve not only exchange of information but also exchange of semantic
content. 3. When a coalition self-organizes it actually performs as an ad-hoc cognitive
agent with its own context and attention mechanism. This means that items of relevance
and the cognitive agency that attends to them co-emerge and are co-dependent. This
is a model more reminiscent of the way bacteria colonies coordinate feats of collective
cognition [Ben-Jacob et al., 2004, Ben-Jacob and Levine, 2006]. In our framework, the
workspace from which actions ensue will always be multiple, distributed and spanning
across a few scales. It will not be confined anymore to the constraints imposed by how
biological brains evolved and developed in higher animals with central nervous system.
When a single cognitive agent is considered, cognition is basically local and amounts
to a recurrent selection of relevant events and selection of a proper reaction to the
selected events. With cognitive agents as components, what we aim at is twofold: (1)
achieving an emergent distributed cognition within a diversified population of cognitive
agents that self-organizes through their interactions and (2) achieving scalability, i.e. the
self-organized coalitions and the processes involved in their emergence need to be such
that they can recursively become the components of self-organization at progressively
higher levels. Our definition of a cognitive agent in subsection 3.1 serves accordingly two
purposes: (1) it serves as a conceptual definition for a generic cognitive agent and (2)
it describes the self-similar theme of our framework: at each level, the cognitive process
is described with different kinds of events and actions but follows the same conceptual
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structure.
Here is how such distributed cognition system would be described given a population
of interacting cognitive agents5:
1. A subset of the population of agents identifies jointly a compound event as an item
of relevance. A compound event is a set of contingent simple events that may or
may not be causally connected or correlated.
2. The subset of agents forms a temporary coalition based on their shared ”interest”.
Agents are reinforced to join coalitions they already joined in the past [Heylighen,
2013b]. This is an abstracted version of the Hebbian rule [Hebb, 1968]: Agents
that cooperated once will tend to cooperate again i.e. reinforce their connections.
The recurrence of a coalition follows the recurrence of its activating compound
event, when the coalition is reinforced and becomes more stable, it also binds, so
to speak, the set of contingent events that stimulated its formation into a distinct
gestalt. This is how compound events are consolidated into ”compound items of
relevance”. The cognitive process therefore takes an active role in structuring the
information flow from the environment.
3. The members of the coalition jointly select and coordinate their actions in response
to the item of relevance that brought them together. While a coalition is active, the
resources of the member agents are committed to the coalition and the connections
among them stay stable.
4. Upon completion of the coordinated action the coalition is dismantled. The agents
become again free to seek opportunistic coalitions but they remember the coali-
tions they participated in and their strength of association to each, so they can join
them again even without being specifically activated. According to this descrip-
tion, distributive cognitive activity is opportunistic as coalitions may form only
once. But the reinforcement mechanisms mentioned in 3.1 are necessary in order
to ensure an ongoing tendency towards forming stable coalitions. Without a bias
towards stability, the emergence of a hierarchy of more complex and capable super
agents will be impossible. The tendency of an agent to participate in a coalition
is dynamic. It starts with a slight bias in favour of joining any coalition. Once a
specific coalition has been joined, the tendency to participate in that specific coali-
tion is reinforced for all participating agents every time it is activated. However,
all specific tendencies decay in time back to their initial strength. If a coalition
is not activated frequently it is eventually forgotten. The rationale behind this
destabilization is double: first, a coalition that is not useful anymore because the
circumstances of the environment have changed will slowly dissipate (be forgotten)
releasing the constituent agents to form novel coalitions6. Second, the increase in
5The population need not be homogeneous. Agents may vary in their structure and function as long
as they share the same platform of communicating events to each other.
6It is assumed that every agent can effectively participate in a limited number of coalitions. If the
number of coalition exceeds the limit, the rate of conflicts and malfunctions will increase and the
whole process may collapse.
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scale necessarily implies an eventual decrease in the number of agents. If coalitions
become too stable, the decrease in the number of agents necessarily implies a de-
crease in the variety of agents that can emerge at that scale. Decrease in variety
will make the whole cognitive system less adaptable (with less options of configu-
ration) at the higher levels, again because the principle of requisite variety. But if
we take care to preserve plasticity at all scales by not letting coalitions to become
unnecessarily stable, the variety at each level will not be bound anymore to the
number of agents at that level as coalitions can reconfigure according to need7.
The structure we propose therefore, never rigidify beyond a certain threshold and
never loses adaptability as it becomes more structurally complex.
5. Before being dismantled, the probability of an agent entering to a similar coalition
in the future is updated according to the procedure outlined in item 4. Reinforce-
ments can be further adjusted positively or negatively depending on the relative
success or failure of the coordinated action selected by the coalition. Such adjust-
ments may allow an adaptive or even evolutionary process to take place modifying
the structure of the coalition but as a rule, unsuccessful coalitions will dissipate
quicker while successful and influential8 coalitions will increase in stability.
6. Agents can participate in many coalitions, because usually their function in one
coalition does not necessarily coincide temporally with their function in other coali-
tions. In cases that there is a conflict, an agent will be bound to the coalition it
is most committed to (according to the level of consolidation of the said coalition
as reflected by the connection strength of its participant agents and possibly addi-
tional parameters). Since coalitions will also have functional redundancy like the
one characteristic in neural nets, they will be able to perform considerably well
also in the absence of a few agents as discussed in [Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2002,
pp. 60-62].
3.4 Coalitions as super agents
A recurring coalition is in fact a cognitive agent too. The exact mechanisms of internal
joining and coordinating are not specified at this level. As long as the behavior of the
coalition can effectively be described in terms of selection for relevance and selection for
effective action, this behavior complies to the definition of a cognitive process. When
we want to emphasize the fact that an agent is constituted from a coalition of other
agents we use the term super-agent. As super-agents emerge, the participating agents
select together and respond to complex items of relevance in the environment. Moreover,
because of their coordinated activities, their internal contexts become coupled and even-
tually form a joint context that can be said to belong to the super-agent9. Super-agents
7This ensures that there can be more kinds of agents than the number of actual agents at a given
instance.
8Influential means that the coalition is either highly connected or incorporated in many other coalitions.
See following sections.
9The coupling of contexts also means that each agent in a coalition becomes aware to the inner state
of other agents in the coalition as its selections and actions takes the inner contexts of other agents
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can be said to discover patterns of events and form concepts of such compound events.
The self-organization process that brings forth super-agents, also bestows structure on
the environment, shaping domains within which these super-agents further interact (for a
discussion of cognitive domains see [von Glasersfeld, 1997]). In the same manner emer-
gent super-agents are capable of acting in a complex manner by producing mutually
organized sequences of compound events. Super-agents as coalitions of many simpler
agents are not entirely deterministic systems. Their characteristics may be given only in
probabilistic terms and their inner structure i.e. the network of their constituent agents
might itself be dynamic. In short, super-agents in this framework are characteristically
plastic and complex.
It is also possible to describe a super-agent as a kind of episodic memory. Episodes
are simply sequences of compound events that recur in a (more or less) specific order.
The super-agents structure remembers the compound events of relevance and associates
each with a compound response. The complex sequences that constitute an episode
trigger complex sequences of appropriate responses. This memory persists as long as it
is reinforced by the recurrence of the relevant triggering events. Once the environmental
circumstances cease to produce the episode, or, there is a change in the agents situation
that renders the particular episode irrelevant, the coalition the structure reinforced
by this episode will start to dissipate and eventually disappear. The episode will be
forgotten and the resources committed to respond to it will be released. Cognitive
activity will proceed along alternative avenues.
To achieve scalability of the cognitive process it is required that the structure (and
dynamics) of super-agents will facilitate their further incorporation into yet higher level
coalitions. This requirement highlights the necessary structural self-similarity of the
framework.
3.5 Coalitions as a source of novelty
A cognitive agent can always be described from two complementary points of view. The
first point of view focuses on the structure and function of the cognitive agent in terms
of input/output relations. From this point of view the agent is an independent dynamic
system with more or less specific behavioral tendencies. Every input event, combined
with the current state of the agent will make it follow a trajectory towards another state.
Aspects of the trajectory and the new state will also determine possible output events.
The second point of view focuses on the connections and coalitions a cognitive agent
participates in. From this point of view the agent is described in terms of its capacities
to affect and be affected by other agents in a heterogeneous population of agents [De
Landa, 2011, pp. 1-6]. Agents can affect other agents via their actions and can be
affected by other agents via their attention mechanism (which intentions of one agent
gain the attention of another). A capacity to affect must involve another agents capacity
to be affected. The important point here is that these capacities cannot be predicted
from the dynamics of any single agent. Moreover, the variety within the population of
into account. In this sense, within a coalition there emerges a state of global awareness because of
the said coupling.
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agents gives rise to a combinatorial variety in capacities to affect and be affected which
is translated to a variety of possible combined behaviors.
It follows that the behavior of coalitions of agents cannot be determined solely from
the behaviors of the component agents. It might seem trivial at first sight but this
unpredictability of capacities to affect and be affected is the source of the nearly inex-
haustible innovation potential of coalitions. Any new capacity that emerges expands the
horizon of additional new capacities. New capacities depend of course on the properties
emergent in the dynamics of coalitions. When a coalition consolidates the various ca-
pacities that are expressed in the interactions among its participating agents give rise to
the dynamism associated with the super-agent that emerges. The new agents properties
are the resource of the capacities of the next level.
The combinatorial alignment of capacities among interacting agents is the process
that critically produces novelty via the formation of new coalitions (super-agents) and
stand therefore at the basis of the emergence of novel cognitive functions. From this
perspective we can plausibly argue that our framework is capable, at least conceptually,
to demonstrate open-ended innovation in cognitive capacities.
4 Extended framework of cognitive development
After putting together the conceptual ground we can now proceed to describe the future
of the Web in terms of the cognitive development. We therefore first summarize main
considerations of the above discussion as premises for the further development of the
concept.
Agent – We associate our concept of a generic cognitive agent with that of Burns
and Engdahl [Burns and Engdahl, 1998a]. They consider what they call ”agential
capabilities” that in addition to what is implied by our framework also emphasizes
the social construction of the identity (as embodied by its inner state) of every
agent, meaning that the representation of self is always partially constructed from
its social image. Any such socially constructed agent e.g. technological artifacts,
social institutions and networks, worldviews, bacteria, anthills, human beings, etc.
is considered therefore a cognitive agent. Cognitive agents are differentiated by the
level of their cognitive development which also reflects their degree of individuation
and sense-making capabilities[Burns and Engdahl, 1998b, p. 13].
Sense-making – We extend the concept of cognitive development from its human re-
lated context [Kegan, 1982] to the generic cognitive agent. In this, more general
framework, any process of sense-making extends the agent’s cognitive competence
and therefore is understood as cognitive development. By taking this approach we
are not concerned about the question ”whether an agent is cognitive or not?”, but
rather focus on questions such as ”what is the current stage of an agent’s cognitive
development?”, ”what is the agent’s trajectory of development in terms of history
and perceived future potential?”. It is important to note that we use the concept
of cognitive development not as a notion of a sequence of these stages as it is used
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in the context of developmental psychology in humans but as a general model of
intelligence expansion.
Sociotechnological system – A cognitive agent at the largest scale and its future trajec-
tories can be described in terms of cognitive development.
The application cognitive development to the sociotechnological system raises a few
open questions which due to scope limits, we only touch here. In our model, a cognitive
agent is recursively composed of smaller cognitive agents (e.g. cells → organs → bodies
→ groups → social institutions → societies → civilizations). It is reasonable to think
that cognitive development at the highest scale (i.e. civilization) is influenced by the
cognitive development processes at lower scales. The question arising here is what is
the nature of this inter-scale interactions. A related question is to what extent research
about eusocial insects informs our understanding, and perhaps more importantly, our
projected direction regarding the future development of the Internet and Web especially
when we think about the emergence of the Global Brain [Le´vy, 1997, p. 47], [Heylighen,
2013a].
4.1 Society of Mind versus Mind of Society
Minsky, explaining the concept of ’Society of Mind’ states that ’words like living and
thinking are useful for describing phenomena that result from certain combinations of
relationship’ [Minsky, 1988]. When discussing collective consciousness (i.e. ”Mind of So-
ciety”), Burns maintains that ”collectives such as families, communities, administrative
organizations, or states, are social agents and can be considered to possess agential capa-
bilities” [Burns and Engdahl, 1998a]. It is obvious that these are different perspectives
to the same phenomenon. When considering an agent, we are perceiving a boundary
between individual and collective, between agent and environment, where the agent itself
is already a collective.
When we analyze a cognitive agent as an individual and see a collective phenomena
that makes this individual what it is, we take the perspective of ’Society of Mind’ towards
the boundary between individual and collective. But when we start from a collective
phenomena and end up observing agential capabilities [Burns and Engdahl, 1998a], we
switch our perspective to ’Mind of Society’ while still observing the same boundary (see
Figure 1).
On the ground of our framework we argue that social institutions e.g., social networks,
government agencies or nation states are cognitive agents. We can observe boundaries
of these entities both from the perspective of ’Mind of Society’ (internal point of view)
and ’Society of Mind’ (external point of view). Furthermore we claim that worldviews
are primary to social institutions and the reason of their existence. The cognitive de-
velopment of these entities depends on their interactions e.g., in a form of networks of
people or their digital identities. Therefore, the degree of cognitive development of the
global sociotechnological system is determined by the dynamics of underlying ecosystem
of worldviews.
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of ”Mind of Society” vs. ”Society of Mind” perspectives.
4.2 The formation of boundaries
A boundary between an individual and a collective is that which separates self from
other. It is important to remember that the boundary itself emerges in the course of
cognitive development. Central to our approach is that the process of individuation
comes prior to the individual as Kegan remarks: ”Evolutionary activity involves the
very creating of the object (a process of differentiation) as well as our relating to it (a
process of integration)”[Kegan, 1982, p. 77].
The ”collectivity” of intelligence and individuation can be observed at two levels:
1. The individuation of each agent is driven by the surrounding environment which
is a collective of agents. The process of the boundary formation between self and
other does not depend solely on any of separated parts. Rather it is formed in the
process of co-evolution and reflexive progressive determination when individual
affects and is being affected by its environment.
2. The actions of a [pre-]individuated agent are driven by the competition and inter-
action among of internalized objects (”Society of Mind”). Within the framework
of cognitive development of the Web we are concerned with the creative ecology
of mental (as well as digital) representations and vicarious selectors, instead of
physical embodiments.
At every instance of the process, an agent holds perceptional objects and is being held
as one of the perceptional objects of the surrounding agents. The interplay between
these two aspects of ”collectivity” form the individual-milieu dyad referred by Simondon
[Simondon, 1992, p. 3], which is equivalent to the boundary between scales of cognition.
4.3 Object relations theory
The extended cognitive development process can be described as an ongoing balancing
of subject-object relationship [Kegan, 1982, Pruyn, 2010] across the boundary of
an agent. Subject-object relationship is the key mechanism describing how agents make
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sense of their sensory input. It is a recursive cycle of the following sub-processes ([Kegan,
1982, Pruyn, 2010, Kegan, 1995]):
• Being subject to the sensory experience, e.g. when a young child is sad, he/she
does not relate to sadness as ’a temporary mental state’, but IS sadness.
• Separation of the sensory input/experience to an object i.e. creation of boundary
with the environment. Note that the theory does not assert that the subject differ-
entiates a priori between ’internal’ and ’external’ experiences. This differentiation
is achieved during the cognitive development process with the goal to make sense
of the totality of experiences. For example, a baby starting to recognize his/her
mother as a separate individual.
• Holding an experience an object. After separating an object and pushing it out-
side of its own representation of self, the agent remains with the internal mental
representation of that object.
• Using internal mental representation of objects for regulating experiences, including
through actions. Again, taking a child as an example, after internalizing the object
of mother, a child can spend increasingly more time alone, finding comfort by
relating to the internal rather ’the real’ object.
It is our thesis is that analogous sub-processes can be adopted into our extended frame-
work of cognitive development.
Figure 2: A graphical illustration of cognitive development process as subject/object relationship, adapted from
[Pruyn, 2010]
4.4 The ”collectivity” of intelligence
The mechanism of cognitive development applies both to what we call individual and
collective intelligence, which we understand as different scales of the same phenomenon.
The collective nature of the process can be approached from both perspectives of ”Mind
of Society” and ”Society of Mind” (see Figure 1 on page 15) as well as collective indi-
viduation[Yuk Hui and Harry Halpin, 2013].
Recursive levels of perceived boundaries between individual agencies and their collec-
tives result in overlapping hierarchies of agents which emerge from interaction of simpler
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agents. This general structure is conceptualized by our framework for scalable cognition
(see subsection 3.2). We posit scales of cognition not only because of their physical man-
ifestations e.g. neurons → brains → societies, or mental manifestations e.g. thoughts
→ memes → minds → cultures, but also because cognitive capabilities of agents at any
boundary develop through interactions between scales. Approached from the perspective
of social construction of consciousness, ”collective reflectivity emerges as a function of an
organization or group producing and making use of collective representations of the self
(we, our group, community, organization, nation) [..]”[Burns and Engdahl, 1998a, Burns
and Engdahl, 1998b].
Taking a complementary perspective to intelligence as a ’Mind of Society’; merging
the concepts of collective and individual intelligence; establishing its close ties with the
environment and, most importantly, keeping in mind the definition of intelligence as a
process of sense-making of the environment, we start to observe the relevance of the
constructive-developmental approach to attempts to understand collective intelligence
in the context of the development of the Web.
We understand cognition, intelligence (and actually, life) as a constant process of dif-
ferentiation and integration, simultaneous growth and decay, separation from certain
established structures and identification with others together with creation and destruc-
tion of internal representations of those structures. All these processes can be described
under the wider concept of individuation [Simondon, 1992, Combes, 2013]. Individ-
uation is defined in a much broader context than the psychological and encompasses
physical systems, the evolution of organisms and life. By integrating the concepts of
individuation and cognitive development we see them as describing a general principle
of intelligence expansion across multiple scales of complex systems involving physical,
biological, psychological as well as social and digital dimensions.
5 The cognitive development of the Web
We argue that the evolution of our the Web can be conceptualized as a cognitive develop-
ment process. Furthermore, we propose that what we call a distributed governance in A
World of Views[Veitas and Weinbaum, 2013] is the next phase of the cognitive develop-
ment of the human society whose current stage of cognitive development can roughly be
compared to the one of an infant, meaning an intelligence dealing with reflexes, impulses
and perceptions but having no needs and wishes distinguishable from these as yet.
It is quite clear that the cognitive development of humanity through the World Wide
Web will not follow the stages of human cognitive development which are derived from
different collective patterns of sense-making that originate from human biological evo-
lution and cultural history. According to our framework, all the scales of cognition are
structurally coupled and co-evolve, therefore, the cognitive development of the global
sociotechnological system cannot take place without a corresponding development of
human agents and their social institutions. If human society is to reach its next phase of
cognitive development, the lower scales of this cognitive agency i.e. human individuals
and their social institutions, need to further evolve their sense-making capabilities as
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well.
At the highest scale of cognitive agency that represents the individuation of human
civilization as a whole, we put special emphasize on worldviews as the complex organizing
patterns that characterize super-agents. We maintain that for the development of cog-
nitive agents two operational contexts are necessary: the one represented by the ”Mind
of Society” perspective which highlights the motion towards integration and unity and
the one represented by the ”Society of Mind” perspective which highlights multiplicity
as an ecology of challenge, co-evolution and differentiation that provides circumstances
for the open-ended cognitive development of its participants.
We envision the future sociotechnological system as a multiplicity of unique, modular,
open, co-evolving and competing worldviews. The development of such system will be
largely influenced by current and future information technologies of the Web and the
Internet at large. In our vision, the Global Brain is more a platform for interaction
of competing and cooperating multiple cognitive agencies than a singular unified entity
that runs the risk of becoming a dead-end of intelligence expansion in the long run. We
advocate therefore A World of Views and distributed governance as a facilitating plat-
form of the Global Brain because they promise the open-ended nature and antifragility
of the global sociotechnological system.
5.1 Distributed governance
Informed by the discussion above we argue that there is no single structure or model
of the future sociotechnological system which can handle the increasing complexity and
unpredictability of the world [Taleb, 2012]. Therefore we see more importance in devel-
oping a global sociotechnological system towards a hypothesis testing engine not unlike
the human cognitive system, but with much more permeable boundaries.
Hypothesis testing engine in the social realm means the ability to effectively respond
to the needs of the global system for the new structures, institutions and initiatives in
order to deal with the challenges at hand (e.g. climate change). Due to limited resources,
massive hypothesis testing in the social domain requires an effective mechanism of both
integrating and disintegrating social structures and institutions in a manner analogous
to open source projects.
The implementation of these principles needs a change of basic conception of gov-
ernance, namely, its rigid hierarchical nature. For an in-depth discussion of why hi-
erarchical thinking is not suitable for near and far future see [Veitas and Weinbaum,
2013].
We envision distributed governance as an ecology, medium and a mobilization system
for supporting the process of cognitive development of the global sociotechnological
system. For that, distributed governance needs to facilitate four functions:
1. provide the necessary sustainable platform for a future society;
2. allow for the co-existence of diverse worldviews and agencies (humans, their collec-
tives, social institutions and smart technological artifacts, including digital plat-
forms);
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3. provide a medium for evolution of intelligence through communication, dialogue
and co-evolution among diverse cognitive agents;
4. establish an effective way of propagating successful experiments and containing
failures which may be achieved by promoting a tight but dynamic coupling be-
tween different scales of the sociotechnological system (humans → worldviews →
social institutions → sociotechnological system) enabling the on-going disintegra-
tion of obsolete social structures and the establishment of new ones in a distributed
manner.
In this essay we formulate broad principles of how we think our global sociotechnolog-
ical system can and should be guided into the future. We do not provide specific recipes
for regimes of governance because we think these are not practical. We emphasize in-
stead the significance of the dynamics of change and we draw what we believe to be the
correct direction of future trajectories.
We admit that much more work is needed for specifying the mechanisms through which
distributed governance could be established taking the current status of the world as a
point of departure. Nevertheless, formulating the conceptual principles of the desired
system is the first necessary step.
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